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IC-l THE SUPRE.:-lE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-~·lLRICd..'\I c;...SGALTY COMPA..'\IY 
~F REDDI~G PE~lNSYLVAi.'\IIA 
and ~ARRY RICHARDS SILVER, 
Ad.rr:inistrator of the 
Estate of LYNN RICHARDS 
SI!..VE:R, Deceased, 
v. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
:::AGLE ST..!\R INSURANCE 
COMPANY, LTD. , 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 14800 
RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing in the above entitled 
action in ~hich this Court reversed the decision of the lower 
Co:.irt which held in favor of the plaintiffs and respondents 
and against the defendant and appellant. 
DISPOSITION 
This Court, on the 8th of August, 1977, reversed the 
:~dgnent of the District Court whidlhad entered sununary judgment 
~~ favor of respondents American Casualty Company and the Estate 
of Ly~n Richards Silver. This Court further entered a declara-
t:::iry ::~c.gnent in favor of the appellant, Eagle Star Insurance 
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RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent seeks reversal of this Court's opinion 
of August 8, 1977 and reinstatement of the judgment awarded 
in the lower court; or alternatively, a remand to the lower 
court for trial on the issue of whether or not the flight 
in question was for "remuneration". 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A Cessna 310 aircraft, owned by Sileo Corporation, 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, crashed on June 22, 1972 killing t~ 
pilot, Lynn Richards Silver, his wife and two other passengers 
Various liability claims have been filed and this action has 
been brought to determine which insurance company is obligated 
to defend the Estate of Lynn Richards Silver and pay claims 
for which the estate may be found liable. 
Eagle Star's "Hull and Liability Policy" was 
written on the specific aircraft which crashed. This 
policy provided primary insurance coverage to the aircraft. 
American Casualty Company's insurance is secondary 
in that it insured Sileo Corporation under an umbrella policy 
which provided that it would indemnify the insured for loss 
in excess of the total applicable limits of the underlying 
insurance. This umbrella policy specifically acknowledged 
underlying coverage for "aircraft liability" through the 
insurer, Eagle Star Insurance Company, in the sum of 
$1,000,000. 
Eagle Star has primary coverage for all losses 
arising from the plane crash unless it is found that the 
insurance contract excludes coverage because of "remuneration" 
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having been paid for the use of the aircraft. 
Respondent, American Casualty Company, filed a brief 
citing cases from six jurisdictions which have construed or 
inferred "remuneration" as requiring a profit incentive, or 
something in addition to the reimbursement of normal operating 
costs or expenses. 
follows: 
This Court interpreted the term "remuneration" as 
But it is also sometimes used in the broader 
sinse of simply paying something for such 
service, loss or expense. (Emphasis added) • 
and cited for authority a dictionary definition and one Louisiana 
case. 
The Court went on in its opinion to recognize that in 
a dispute between an insured and its carrier, ambiguities of 
terminology should be resolved in favor of coverage and against 
the drafter of the document by stated: 
. . . we recognize the validity of the rule 
that if an insurance policy is ambiguous 
or uncertain, so that it is fairly susceptible 
of different interpretations, any doubt should 
be resolved in favor of insurance coverage. 
However, the Court found no ambiguity in the meaning 
of "remuneration" and reversed the lower court's judgment for 
respondent and in effect granted declaratory judgment in favor 
of appellant. 
POINT I 
"REMUNERATION" IS AN AMBIGUOUS TERM WHICH IS 
FAIRLY SUSCEPTIBLE OF DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS. 
This court, in its opinion, stated: 
A primary meaning of the term "remuneration" is to 
-3-
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pay an equivalent for, i.e., in the sense of 
reimbursing for a service loss or expense 
But this does not mean that a profit must be 
realized. 
The term "remuneration" or to "remunerate" does, i:. 
fact have different meanings; an equivalent in the sense of 
reimbursing for a service loss or expense, OR a profit, that 
is, compensation over and above expenses. 
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabric: 
Second Edition defines "remunerative." as: "Yielding a suffici; 
return; affording ample remuneration; profitable; as a remune: 
ative position". (Emphasis added) . 
The following cases which were cited in Respondents' 
Brief, clearly stand for the proposition that "remuneration" 
requires a profit or compensation over and above expe.nses: 
Remuneration should include a fair profit on 
the performance of any service, and compensation 
for any service should also include such profit 
although strictly speaking, it may have a 
narrower meaning. Anchor Coal Company v. Public 
Service Commission, 15 S.E. 2d 406. 
The earnings of the (taxidab) drivers over and 
above the $3. 00 and cost of the gasoline constitue 
the remuneration or wages for their services and 
it is not necessary that they be paid directly by 
appellee. Kaus v. Unemployment Compensation 
Commission, 299 N.W. 715 (Iowa 1971) 
These cases and the above definition evidence the de: 
meaning of the term "remuneration", and inasmuch as this term 
was not defined in Eagle Star's Hull and Liability policy of 
insurance, it should, because of its ambiguity, be construed 
against Eagle Star in favor of coverage, at least to the retai: 
limit interest of its insured, the Estate of Lynn Richards Sil' 
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POINT II 
THERE WAS NOT COMPLETE REIMBURSEMENT OF 
EXPENSES TO SATISFY COURT'S DEFINITION 
OF REMUNERATION. 
The Court in its decision accepted as a definition 
of remuneration "in the sense of reimbursing for a service, 
loss or expense" and then stated: 
Our conclusion is this: that if "remuneration" be 
understood as merely an equivalent, there is no 
question whatsoever but that the use of the 
plane was so "remunerated". 
This Court may have failed to take note that not even 
an "equivalent" amount was received by Sileo Corporation for 
the planes use. It is a well settled business principle that 
the cost of operating any business machine or vehicle includes 
such intangibles as depreciation and loss of use. 
In the instant case there was no agreement of any kind 
that purported to reimburse Sileo Corporation for its depreciation 
expense or for the expense of loss of use. "Reimbursement" means 
to pay back that which has been expended. Woenz v. Schumacher, 
56 NE 72, (New York). Since there was no agreement of any kind 
that provided for reimbursement of depreciation or loss of use 
of the airplane, under the Court's own definition there was 
no sufficient reimbursement or equivilence paid to constitute 
"remuneration". 
It is significant to note that not even the appellant 
contended that "remuneration" meant nothing more than reimbursement 
for expenses, but contended that under the facts of the case 
in question, there was more than reimbursement for expenses. 
Respondents deny that under the facts there was anything more 
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than reimbursement for normal operating expenses. The lower 
Court ruled as a matter of law that under the facts of the ca: 
there was nothing more than reimbursement for o t' pera ing exper,: 
If this Court cannot affirm that ruling as a matter of law, t 
the case should be remanded for a trial by jury to determine 
that fact. 
SUMMARY 
Since this Court's opinion of August 8, 1977 recogn: 
that respondents cited cases in its principal brief which con: 
"remuneration" as requiring a profit motive, it cannot cite 
authorities to the contrary and then say, with consistency, 
that there is no ambiguity in the meaning of the term as it wa 
used in appellant policy, which did not define its meaning. 
And, since the Court has recognized that if there is an ambi~ 
in the meaning of language in an insurance policy it should be 
resolved in favor of coverage, it cannot overlook such adrnitte. 
different meanings as are mentioned in the Court's decision an: 
then deny coverage. 
WHEREFORE, respondents pray for a rehearing of the 
Court opinion which has been entered in this action and, there: 
a reversal of said opinion to reinstate the judgment for respo: 
entered before, or in the alternative, for a remand to the 
trial court for a jury trial on the issue of whether or notu~ 
the facts of this case the flight in question was or was not f: 
remuneration. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of August, 1971. 
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